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Comments 
Salvaging the Term “Suitor”:  How the 
Declaratory Judgment Act Has 
Commandeered Congressional Intent 
Brett P. Hargaden∗ 
“I consider [trial by jury] as the only anchor, ever yet imagined 
by man, by which a government can be held to the principles of [its] 
constitution.” – Thomas Jefferson1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following scenario.  An experienced mariner 
captains a twenty-five-foot fishing vessel off the east coast of 
Florida for recreational fishing purposes.  Hoping to catch a variety 
of pelagic species that are commonly found off the southeast coast 
of the continental United States, the captain must venture out 
beyond the sight of land to the bright blue waters of the Gulf 
Stream.2  To protect his investment in the vessel, he purchases a 
 
∗  Candidate for J.D., Roger Williams University School of Law, 2017; B.B.A., 
Stetson University, 2014.  For my parents, Patrick and Alison Hargaden.  
Without your constant guidance and support, this would not be possible.  
Thank you Professor Jonathon Gutoff, William Burnham, and Casey 
Charkowick, for your time and effort.  Finally, thank you Cayman Calabro, for 
being supportive and understanding through the writing process.  I could not 
have done this without you.   
 1.  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine (July 11, 1789), in 15 
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 266, 266–70 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958). 
 2.  See Offshore Fishing, FLORIDA GO FISHING, http://www.florida 
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marine insurance policy.  His policy is comprehensive, in that it 
covers the value of the vessel and any liability arising from its use.3  
In order to offer affordable insurance rates to its customers, the 
insurance company includes specific provisions in the agreement 
that prohibit certain behavior, minimizing the chance of accidents 
or incidents that would result in an insurance claim.4  One of these 
provisions, generally called a “navigational warranty,” requires the 
captain to stay within a certain geographical area or else forfeit 
coverage.5  In this case, the captain is required to stay within thirty-
five nautical miles of land at all times, which is acceptable to the 
angler because his normal grounds are only ten to twenty nautical 
miles offshore.6 
One day, however, the captain is out thirty nautical miles 
chasing a large school of fish when the vessel’s entire electronic 
system fails.  A large storm unexpectedly comes through the area; 
without any means of propulsion, the boat drifts offshore another 
fifteen to twenty nautical miles, going well beyond the geographical 
limit outlined in his insurance policy.  Unfortunately, the vessel 
begins to take on water and eventually goes down.  The captain is 
 
gofishing.com/fishing-offshore.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2017).  Target species 
include, but are not limited to, dolphin (mahi-mahi), tuna, wahoo, and sailfish.  
See id. 
 3.  The portion of the insurance policy that covers damage to the vessel 
itself is called hull insurance. F.D. ROSE, MARINE INSURANCE: LAW AND 
PRACTICE 331 (2d ed. 2012).  The portion that covers any liability resulting from 
an accident while the vessel is in use is called collision liability insurance or a 
“running down clause.”  See id.   
 4.  See BARIS SOYER, WARRANTIES IN MARINE INSURANCE 3 (2d ed. 2006) 
(“Accordingly, from the insurer’s point of view, the extent of the risk is crucial, 
as his liability will largely depend on it. The warranties incorporated into the 
contract play an essential role in assessing the risk. For example, a warranty 
to the effect that the insured vessel will not navigate in a certain area gives an 
idea to the insurer about the extent of the risk he has agreed to provide cover 
for.”). 
 5.  See id. at 24–25 (“It is the general understanding of the assured and 
insurer that the ship may navigate in any navigable waters, unless there are 
contrary restrictions in the policy . . . . [A] navigation (locality) warrant[y] 
restrict[s] the movement and operation of the insured vessel . . . . [T]he assured 
undertakes either that the insured vessel will navigate within the confines of 
a specific area, or she will not navigate in specific waters or beyond a specific 
point.”).   
 6.  “On salt water, distances are measured in nautical miles, a unit about 
1/7th longer than the land or statute mile . . . . The international nautical mile 
is slightly more than 6076 feet; the statute mile used on shore and fresh water 
bodies is 5280 feet.”  ELBERT S. MALONEY, CHAPMAN PILOTING: SEAMANSHIP AND 
SMALL BOAT HANDLING 11 (55th ed. 1981). 
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fortunate enough to transmit a distress signal, and the U.S. Coast 
Guard later rescues him. 
Months later, the captain files a claim with his insurance 
company for the value of his vessel.  After discovering where the 
vessel sank, the insurance company refuses to pay the claim, 
asserting that the breach of the navigational warranty voids the 
captain’s coverage.7  Before the captain’s attorney can file a 
complaint in state court, the insurance company files a declaratory 
judgment action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District 
of Florida.  The captain’s attorney explains to him that because this 
action is in federal court, he will not have the opportunity to argue 
his case in front of a jury of his peers as he had hoped.  His attorney 
explains that, instead of a jury making the factual findings in the 
case, one federal judge will take on the role of the fact-finder and 
make all of the decisions in that regard.  Can the captain’s attorney 
contest this trial format, and demand a trial by jury? 
Marine insurance contracts undoubtedly fall within the 
jurisdiction of the federal district courts under Article III, Section 
II of the U.S. Constitution, as supplemented by the relevant 
statutory grant in 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1).8  These two provisions, taken 
together, have given rise to a unique and unsettled area of 
jurisdictional law.  One difficult concept that constantly frustrates 
federal courts attempting to resolve these novel issues of maritime 
law is the relationship between other constitutional and statutory 
provisions of federal subject-matter jurisdiction, such as the 
Declaratory Judgment Act,9 and the effect these provisions might 
have on the practical procedural consequences of a case, such as the 
right to a jury trial, when cases can be heard both “in admiralty” 
 
 7.  See SOYER, supra note 4, at 133 (“[E]xact compliance doctrine” 
requires that “the obligation undertaken by a marine warranty must be exactly 
complied with . . . .”).  
 8.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend . . . to 
all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction . . . .”); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333 
(Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-254) (“The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of 
admiralty or maritime jurisdiction . . . .”); New England Mut. Marine Ins. Co. 
v. Dunham, 78 U.S. 1, 26 (1870) (“[T]he true criterion is the nature and subject-
matter of the contract, as whether it was a maritime contract, having reference 
to maritime service or maritime transactions.”); Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s 
Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 313 (1955) (“Since the insurance policy here sued 
on is a maritime contract the Admiralty Clause of the Constitution brings it 
within federal jurisdiction.”). 
 9.  28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2201–2202 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-254). 
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and “at law.”  This Comment will argue that, when an insurance 
company brings a declaratory judgment action against a client 
regarding the existence of coverage and the insured party demands 
a jury trial during the proceeding, the court should ultimately allow 
the insured party to have a jury trial on all factual issues of the 
case. 
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
A. Federal Subject-Matter Jurisdiction 
When the “admiralty and maritime” clause was included in 
Article III Section II of the U.S. Constitution, but prior to the 
enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1789, many believed that parties 
bringing an action involving admiralty and maritime claims would 
be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal judiciary.10  
Stated another way, the only courts that could hear cases of this 
subject matter were federal admiralty courts. However, we know 
today that aggrieved parties that have claims satisfying the 
judicially created jurisdictional hurdles of 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1)11 now 
 
 10.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see Jonathan M. Gutoff, Original 
Understandings and the Private Law Origins of the Federal Admiralty 
Jurisdiction:  A Reply to Professor Casto, 30 J. MAR. L. & COM. 361, 383-84 
(1999) (“If the federal admiralty were not thought to have exclusive jurisdiction 
over certain private law admiralty matters, some parties should have 
continued to litigate admiralty disputes in the appropriate state courts. This 
did not happen.”); see Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 443 
(2001) (“Article III, § 2, of the United States Constitution vests federal courts 
with jurisdiction over all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Section 
9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 codified this grant of exclusive original 
jurisdiction, but ‘sav[ed] to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law 
remedy, where the common law is competent to give it’”) (citations omitted). 
 11.  There are two jurisdictional hurdles for tort actions brought “in 
admiralty.”  The first is the “locus” requirement.  See 46 U.S.C.A. § 30101 
(Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–254) (“The admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction of the United States extends to and includes cases of injury or 
damage, to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable waters, even 
though the injury or damage is done or consummated on land.”).  Section 30101 
extends the traditional “rule of locality in cases of marine torts” described in 
The Plymouth, which held that “the wrong and injury complained of must have 
been committed wholly upon the high seas or navigable waters, or, at least, the 
substance and consummation of the same must have taken place upon these 
waters to be within the admiralty jurisdiction.”  See id.; 70 U.S. 20, 34-35 
(1865).  Originally, courts had difficultly determining which waters were 
“navigable” under the locus requirement.  See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 
563 (1870) (“Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law 
which are navigable in fact.  And they are navigable in fact when they are used, 
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have a variety of avenues when deciding where to bring their claims 
based on a particular provision of § 1333(1), famously titled the 
“Saving-to-Suitors” clause.12 
The “Savings-to-Suitors” clause allows claimants to bring 
maritime actions in state courts, subject to certain exceptions.13  
The clause also allows claimants to bring maritime actions “at law” 
in federal district courts under an alternative basis of federal 
subject-matter jurisdiction, typically § 1332 diversity jurisdiction14 
or § 1331 federal question jurisdiction.15  However, if a claimant 
chooses to bring a maritime action in a federal district court under 
 
or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for 
commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the 
customary modes of trade and travel on water.”).  Likewise, courts have 
recently struggled to define the term “vessel” under the Act.  See Lozman v. 
City of Riviera Beach, 133 S. Ct. 735, 741 (2013) (“[I]n our view a structure 
does not fall within the scope of [the] statutory phrase [defining a vessel] unless 
a reasonable observer, looking to the home’s physical characteristics and 
activities, would consider it designed to a practical degree for carrying people 
or things over water.”).  The second jurisdictional hurdle is the “nexus” 
requirement; however, it is still unclear if nexus is required in cases involving 
accidents on the “high seas.”  See Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes 
Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534 (1995) (“A court, first, must ‘assess the 
general features of the type of incident involved’ to determine whether the 
incident has ‘a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce.  Second, 
a court must determine whether ‘the general character’ of the ‘activity giving 
rise to the incident’ shows a ‘substantial relationship to traditional maritime 
activity.’” (quoting Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 363-65, 364 n.2 (1990)).  There 
is only one test for maritime contract jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Dunham, 78 U.S. 
at 26 (“[T]he true criterion is the nature and subject-matter of the contract, as 
whether it was a maritime contract, having reference to maritime service or 
maritime transactions.”).  
 12.  28 U.S.C.A. § 1333(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-254) 
(“[S]aving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise 
entitled.”); Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 362 (1959). 
“What the drafters of the Judiciary Act intended in creating the saving to 
suitors clause is not entirely clear and has been the subject of some debate.” 
Lewis, 531 U.S. at 444 (citing Jonathan M. Gutoff, Original Understandings 
and the Private Law Origins of the Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction: A Reply to 
Professor Casto, 30 J. MAR. L. & COM. 361, 387-90 (1999)) 
 13.  See The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. at 431 (precluding California state 
court from allowing plaintiff to bring action in rem against vessel and having 
vessel arrested); Phillips v. Sea Tow/Sea Spill of Savannah, 578 S.E.2d 846, 
851 (Ga. 2003) (precluding a claim for salvage even though the suit was in 
personam as opposed to in rem); Lewis, 531 U.S. at 453 (explaining that 
petitions for limitation of liability are reserved for federal district courts).  
 14.  28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (Westlaw).   
 15.  Id. § 1331; see Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., Inc., 317 U.S. 239, 
245–46 (1942).   
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a basis of federal subject-matter jurisdiction other than § 1333(1), 
then the plaintiff must satisfy the general requirements of that 
specific statutory provision.  Examples of these statutory provisions 
include § 1332 diversity jurisdiction, which requires complete 
diversity among the parties and satisfaction of the amount in 
controversy requirement,16 § 1331 federal question jurisdiction, 
which requires a well-pleaded complaint.17 
The “Saving-to-Suitors” clause of § 1333(1) provides concurrent 
jurisdiction between federal district courts sitting “in admiralty,” 
federal district courts “at law,” and state courts.18  That is, the 
clause allows a plaintiff to choose between three different forums 
when bringing a claim: a federal district court sitting “in 
admiralty,” a federal district court “at law,” or the general 
jurisdiction of any state court.  There are many benefits and 
consequences for each choice of forum, and a plaintiff must consider 
those before making this decision. 
B. “Hybrid Cases” 
The “Saving-to-Suitors” clause routinely causes procedural 
conflicts among federal district courts in what have been described 
as “hybrid cases.”19  “Hybrid cases” are those where the plaintiff 
 
 16.  See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267, 267–68 (1806) (creating the 
“complete diversity rule”); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (Westlaw) (“[W]here the matter 
in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and 
costs . . . .”). 
 17.  Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) 
(“[A] suit arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States only 
when the plaintiff’s statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based 
upon those laws or that Constitution.  It is not enough that the plaintiff alleges 
some anticipated defense to his cause of action and asserts that the defense is 
invalidated by some provision of the Constitution of the United States.”).   
 18.  See Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. 441, 441 (1847) (“[T]he courts of common 
law may have concurrent jurisdiction in a case with the admiralty.”).  A case 
has “concurrent subject matter jurisdiction” when the case satisfies the subject 
matter jurisdiction of both the state and federal court.  RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 166 (3d ed. 2012).   
 19.  See Lily Kurland, Note, A Trying Balance: Determining the Trier of 
Fact in Hybrid Admiralty-Civil Cases, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1293, 1320 (2013); 
see also Reliance Nat. Ins. Co. (Eur.) v. Hanover, 222 F. Supp. 2d 110, 115–16 
(D. Mass. 2002) (“When a claim brought in admiralty triggers a compulsory 
counterclaim for which a defendant (plaintiff-in-counterclaim) requests a jury 
trial, the result is a ‘hybrid’ proceeding.  While there is no uniform answer to 
the question as to how a court is to proceed in a hybrid case, it is required to do 
its utmost to protect a party’s right to a jury trial.”) (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted)).  
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has filed an action under the federal district court’s admiralty 
jurisdiction set out in § 1333(1) and has designated the case as an 
admiralty claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(h).20  After 
the plaintiff files a claim “in admiralty,” the named defendant in 
the action files a counterclaim. However, instead of invoking 
admiralty jurisdiction, the defendant invokes diversity jurisdiction 
or federal question jurisdiction as an independent basis of federal 
subject-matter jurisdiction.  This decision allows the defendant in 
the action to demand a jury trial on the “legal” claim.21  The 
ultimate issue in these “hybrid cases” is how the district court 
should rule on the defendant’s demand for a jury trial on the “legal” 
counterclaims.22  The conflicting interests that the district court 
must consider are the defendant’s Seventh Amendment right to a 
jury trial23 and the plaintiff’s preference for a bench trial, a 
preference that is consistent with a customary mode of trial 
procedure in admiralty law.24 
 
 20.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(h) (“If a claim for relief is within the admiralty or 
maritime jurisdiction and also within the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction on 
some other ground, the pleading may designate the claim as an admiralty or 
maritime claim for purposes of Rules 14(c), 38(e), and 82 and the Supplemental 
Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions.  A claim 
cognizable only in the admiralty or maritime jurisdiction is an admiralty or 
maritime claim for those purposes, whether or not so designated.”).  This 
specific rule is a sub-section of Rule 9, which requires heightened specificity in 
pleadings for certain causes of action; its purpose is to identify claims that have 
multiple bases of federal subject-matter jurisdiction, described above as 
“hybrid cases.”  See id.   
 21.  See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value 
in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved . . . .”); FED. R. CIV. P. 38(a) (“The right of trial by jury as declared by 
the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution—or as provided by a federal 
statute—is preserved to the parties inviolate.”). 
 22.  Typically, the plaintiff in the case will move to strike the defendant’s 
jury demand.  
 23.  U.S. CONST. amend. VII.  
 24.  See Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. 441, 460 (1847) (holding that the 
Seventh Amendment does not apply to cases “in admiralty”); Vodusek v. 
Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 153 (4th Cir. 1995) (“Traditionally . . . 
admiralty courts and courts of equity did not rely on juries.”); Koch Fuels, Inc. 
v. Cargo of 13,000 Barrels of No. 2 Oil, 704 F.2d 1038, 1041 (8th Cir. 1983) 
(“Ordinarily, admiralty claims are tried to the court.”); but see Wilmington 
Trust v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Hawaii, 934 F.2d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 
1991) (“Regardless of whether a claim is cognizable in admiralty, the right to 
a jury trial on such claim is preserved despite plaintiff’s election to proceed in 
admiralty. This court has acknowledged that the non-jury component of 
admiralty jurisdiction must give way to the seventh amendment”).   
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A federal district court has three alternatives when the 
plaintiff moves to strike the defendant’s demand for a jury trial in 
the above situation: (1) the court can designate the plaintiff’s Rule 
9(h) as covering the entire case and hold a bench trial on both 
claims; (2) the court can sever the claims, holding a bench trial for 
the plaintiff’s “admiralty claim” and jury trial for the defendant’s 
“legal claim”; or (3) the court can hold the defendant’s Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial supersedes the Rule 9(h) 
designation and hold a jury trial on both claims.  This Comment 
will go beyond the typical “hybrid case,” analyzing a narrower and 
more specific class of cases that are a sub-category of the traditional 
“hybrid cases,” and ultimately conclude that, in these specific 
procedural scenarios described below, a court should grant the 
defendant’s jury demand on all relevant claims. 
C. Declaratory Judgment Actions 
The Seventh Amendment issue becomes even more 
complicated when the plaintiff’s action is for declaratory relief, as 
opposed to actual damages.  The prime example, which is the focus 
of this Comment, is that of an insurance company (plaintiff-insurer) 
suing one of its insured clients (defendant-insured).  These cases 
involve mixed questions of law and fact and are usually brought to 
obtain a federal district court’s declaration as to the insurance 
company’s liability, define the scope of the policy in question, or 
both.  Typically, a case such as this would begin with the insured 
filing a claim against their policy based upon an accident or issue 
that would ultimately invoke a federal district court’s jurisdiction 
through § 1333(1) admiralty jurisdiction and § 1331 federal 
question or § 1332 diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.25  After the 
insurer denies the insurance claim, the insured will prepare to file 
suit to challenge the insurance company’s decision based on a 
breach of contract theory of liability.  However, if the insurance 
company files a declaratory action in federal court under § 1333(1), 
seeking a determination of overall liability and/or the scope of 
 
 25.  Under the hypothetical situation, the sinking of the recreational 
fishing vessel would be the accident invoking both § 1333(1) admiralty 
jurisdiction, as well as § 1332 diversity jurisdiction.  It is not, however, 
required that another independent basis of federal subject matter jurisdiction, 
other than § 1333(1), exist for this situation to arise.  The accident will almost 
always fall into the state’s general jurisdiction, and is always an alternative 
avenue for the plaintiff.   
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coverage under the marine insurance contract, before the insured 
party can bring the breach of contract claim, the entire nature of 
the case is altered. 
The purpose of this declaratory action is two-fold: first, the 
insurance company wants to quickly resolve this dispute; and 
second, if the insurance company sues “in admiralty,” it can elect to 
proceed without a jury trial.26  After the plaintiff-insurer files suit, 
the defendant-insured is forced to file a compulsory counterclaim 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a).27  The defendant-
insured would then demand a jury trial on the compulsory 
counterclaim, asserting an independent basis of federal subject 
matter jurisdiction and the right to seek that remedy under the 
“Saving-to-Suitors” clause.28 
This Comment will argue that, where a plaintiff-insurer brings 
a declaratory judgment action in a federal district court under 28 
U.S.C. § 1333(1)29 and under Rule 9(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure30 to determine the existence or scope of coverage under 
a policy of marine insurance, and the defendant-insured files a 
counterclaim directly related to the ultimate issue in the plaintiff’s 
initial action, the defendant should have a right to a jury trial under 
the Seventh Amendment and the “Saving-to-Suitors” clause of § 
1333(1). 
Part A of this Comment will provide a general overview of the 
relevant authority on this particular issue.  Part B will discuss the 
procedural consequences following the enactment of the 
Declaratory Judgment Act and the device’s effect on admiralty law.  
Part C will focus on the intended purpose of the “Saving-to-Suitors” 
clause.  Part D will examine how the doctrine of abstention 
influences the right to a jury trial in declaratory judgment cases.  
 
 26.  FED. R. CIV. P. 9(h)(1) (“If a claim for relief is within the admiralty or 
maritime jurisdiction and also within the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction on 
some other ground, the pleading may designate the claim as an admiralty or 
maritime claim for purposes of Rule[] . . . 38(e) . . . .”); FED. R. CIV. P. 38(e) 
(“These rules do not create a right to a jury trial on issues in a claim that is an 
admiralty or maritime claim under Rule 9(h).”). 
 27.  FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a) (“A pleading must state as a counterclaim any 
claim that—at the time of its service—the pleader has against an opposing 
party if the claim: (A) arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the 
subject matter of the opposing party’s claim . . . .”). 
 28.  See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-254). 
 29.  Id.  
 30.  FED. R. CIV. P. 9(h).  
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Finally, Part E will explain the ramifications of precluding a jury 
trial in these cases and will argue the actual intent of insurance 
companies when moving to strike defendant-insureds’ jury 
demands. 
III. INSURED’S RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL 
A. Circuit-Split Overview 
Only two circuits, the Eleventh Circuit and the Fourth Circuit, 
have directly addressed the issue of whether a defendant-insured 
has a right to a jury trial in a declaratory judgment action brought 
by a plaintiff-insurer.  The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit in St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company v. 
Lago Canyon, Inc. affirmed the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Florida’s decision to grant the plaintiff’s motion 
to strike opposing counsel’s demand for a jury trial.31  In this case, 
the defendant-insured owned a yacht that partially sank while 
undergoing engine repairs, causing damage to the vessel in excess 
of $1.2 million.32  The defendant-insured subsequently filed a 
damage claim with the plaintiff-insurer under a marine insurance 
policy.33  The plaintiff-insurer filed a declaratory judgment action, 
asserting that it was not liable for the damage because of a 
corroding part; corrosion was excluded under the policy if found to 
be the cause of the damage.34  The district court granted the 
plaintiff-insurer’s motion to strike the defendant-insured’s jury 
demand.35 The defendant-insured appealed to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, arguing, in part, that the 
district court erred in granting the plaintiff-insurer’s motion to 
strike.36 
The Eleventh Circuit focused on Fifth Circuit precedent in 
Harrison v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., where the court 
 
 31.  561 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 2009).   
 32.  Id. at 1883.  
 33.  Id.  
 34.  Id. at 1183–84.  
 35.  Id. at 1185 (“The district court concluded that St. Paul’s Rule 9(h) 
designation of its marine insurance claim as an admiralty claim trumped Lago 
Canyon’s jury-trial right on its breach-of-contract counterclaim where Lago 
Canyon’s counterclaim arose out of the same operative facts and same Marine 
Policy as St. Paul’s claim.  The district court recognized that there was a split 
of authority on this issue but concluded the binding precedent . . . that both 
claims be tried by the court.”).  
 36.  Id. at 1183. 
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held that in a “hybrid action” involving multiple jurisdictional 
bases, the defendant-insurer’s counterclaim “at law” cannot 
override the plaintiff-insured’s Rule 9(h) designation to proceed “in 
admiralty” without a jury trial when both parties file damages 
claims.37  The Fifth Circuit properly concluded that in a single 
action, when two claims for damages are brought—one by the 
plaintiff-insurer invoking admiralty jurisdiction and the other by 
the defendant-insured invoking the court’s civil jurisdiction—the 
plaintiff-insurer’s choice to designate the claim “in admiralty” 
under Rule 9(h) without a jury trial prevails over the defendant-
insured’s demand for a jury trial.38  This conclusion, however, does 
not address a very different situation where there are not two 
claims brought for damages, but one claim brought for declaratory 
relief and one claim brought for damages.   
In the former situation addressed in Harrison, the plaintiff-
insurer has a legitimate claim for damages that can be brought 
without the use of a statutory vehicle.39  In the latter situation, 
however, the plaintiff-insurer would have no claim against the 
defendant-insured without the statutory vehicle, and traditionally 
would have to wait for the defendant to bring the claim in the court 
of his or her choosing under the “Saving-to-Suitors” clause.40  The 
defendant-insured in St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. raised 
this argument;41 but the court held that the difference in 
jurisdictional basis, as opposed to the distinction in the type of relief 
sought by the plaintiff, required the court to follow Harrison as 
opposed to other Supreme Court precedent addressing declaratory 
judgment actions.42  This distinction is the critical flaw in the 
court’s reasoning, as both parties in Harrison had a legitimate 
claim for damages against one another.43  Where both parties have 
 
 37.  See 577 F.2d 968, 986–88 (5th Cir. 1978).  
 38.  See id.  It is crucial to recognize that the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion 
should be strictly limited to those situations involving “hybrid cases,” as 
opposed to the situation presented in this Comment involving declaratory 
judgments.   
 39.  See id.  
 40.  Going back to the hypothetical posed, without the enactment of the 
Declaratory Judgment Act, the captain’s insurance company would have no 
claim against him until he filed a breach of contract claim.  
 41.  See 561 F.3d at 1188 (“[Defendant-insured] contends that Harrison 
should not apply because [plaintiff-insurer] brought a declaratory judgment 
action, whereas the plaintiff in Harrison brought a suit for damages.”). 
 42.  See id. at 1188–89.  
 43.  See Harrison, 577 F.2d at 986–87. 
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a valid claim for damages, it is understandable why a district court 
would hold that the Rule 9(h) designation supersedes a demand for 
a jury trial, as both parties could be considered a “suitor” under the 
“Saving-to-Suitors” clause.44  However, where only one party has a 
valid claim for damages, and the other party files a claim for a 
declaratory judgment action, it seems that only the party that has 
a valid claim for damages should be considered the “suitor” under 
the clause; it is that party’s choice that should supersede over the 
other party taking advantage of the statutory vehicle. 
There are also many federal district courts that have directly 
addressed this issue, holding that the defendant-insured’s right to 
a jury trial is precluded in cases where the plaintiff-insurer brings 
a declaratory judgment action “in admiralty.”45  These decisions are 
consistent with a traditional characteristic of admiralty law: the 
presiding judge is charged with making findings of fact and 
determinations of law, as opposed to a jury finding the facts of the 
case and limiting the judge’s role to making conclusions of law.46  
One such decision is St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company v. 
Holiday Fair, Inc., where the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York held that the defendant-insured does 
not have a right to a jury trial in a declaratory judgment action.47  
Interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(e)48 and 
distinguishing prior United States Supreme Court precedent, the 
district court determined that the plaintiff-insurer’s “right” to a 
non-jury trial in admiralty cases outweighed the defendant-
 
 44.  See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-254). 
 45.  See Windsor Mount Joy Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 264 F. Supp. 2d 158, 
159 (D.N.J. 2003); Jefferson Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Me. Offshore Boats, Inc., No. 01-
44-P-H, 2001 WL 484040 (D. Me. May 7, 2001); Underwriters Subscribing to 
Certificate of Ins. No. 98B1/800 v. On the Loose Travel, Inc., No. 99-0200-Civ., 
1999 WL 694212 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 1999); St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. 
v. Holiday Fair, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 5707 (TPG), 1996 WL 148350, at *1–2 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1996); Royal Ins. Co. of America v. Hansen, 125 F.R.D. 5, 6–
9 (D. Mass. 1988); Zurich Ins. Co. v. Banana Services, Inc., No. 84-1508-Civ., 
1984 WL 1888 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 26, 1984); Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. 
v. Bauer Dredging Co., 74 F.R.D. 461, 461–62 (S.D. Tex. 1977); Ins. Co. of Pa. 
v. Amaral, 44 F.R.D. 45, 47 (S.D. Tex. 1968).  
 46.  See, e.g., Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 153 (4th Cir. 
1995) (“Traditionally . . . admiralty courts and courts of equity did not rely on 
juries.”). 
 47.  1996 WL 148350, at *1–2.  
 48.  “These rules do not create a right to a jury trial on issues in a claim 
that is an admiralty or maritime claim under Rule 9(h).”  FED. R. CIV. P. 38(e). 
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insured’s request for a jury trial.49 
The district court’s reasoning seems to indicate that the proper 
analysis is based on a balancing of the parties’ interests, specifically 
the plaintiff-insurer’s preference for a bench trial and the 
defendant-insured’s right to a jury trial.  Although the Seventh 
Amendment is not directly implicated because the case technically 
arises “in admiralty,” it can be argued that the defendant-insured’s 
right to a jury trial should be given sufficient weight to tip the scales 
in favor of allowing a jury trial in these specific declaratory 
judgment actions.  This argument also rests upon the notion that 
the traditional characteristic of admiralty law involving bench 
trials has no constitutional basis and should be limited as such 
when new circumstances arise.50  Moreover, the district court also 
asserted that a marine insurance company’s use of a declaratory 
judgment action was “not a mere race to the courthouse,” but 
instead “is a normal and orderly procedure.”51  Without any 
justification or reasoning following this statement, it is hard to 
determine why the court made this conclusion, for it seems the use 
of a declaratory judgment action in this situation is just that: a race 
to the courthouse in order to preclude the defendant-insured from 
obtaining a jury trial.52 
One federal appellate court and a number of federal district 
courts, however, have denied a plaintiff-insurer’s motion to strike a 
defendant-insured’s demand for a jury trial, concluding that the 
defendant-insured’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial 
supersedes a customary feature of admiralty procedure.53  The 
 
 49.  St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 1996 WL 148350, at *2 (“It would seem 
to be a reasonable application of these principles to hold that [the plaintiff-
insurer’s] right to a non-jury trial based on its admiralty claim outweighs [the 
defendant-insured’s] request for a jury trial based on its counterclaim.”). 
 50.  See Fitzgerald v. U.S. Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963) (“While this 
Court has held that the Seventh Amendment does not require jury trials in 
admiralty cases, neither that Amendment nor any other provision of the 
Constitution forbids them.” (footnotes omitted)).  
 51.  St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 1996 WL 148350, at *2.  
 52.  See Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Indus. Terminal & Salvage Co., No. 05CV1142, 
2005 WL 2647950, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 17, 2005) (“If this Court were to strike 
[the defendant-insured’s] jury demand based upon the fact that [the plaintiff-
insurer] was the ‘first to file’ under this factual scenario, the Court would 
essentially be encouraging parties to engage in an inauspicious race to the 
courthouse.”).  
 53.  See In re Lockheed Martin Corp., 503 F.3d 351, 358 (4th Cir. 2007); 
Cont’l Ins. Co., 2005 WL 2647950, at *1 (“Ordinarily, the normal procedure in 
a case where an insurer has denied insurance coverage would be for the 
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United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in In re 
Lockheed Martin Corporation held that the defendant-insured had 
a right to a jury trial, explaining that “the Seventh Amendment 
applies to admiralty claims that are tried ‘at law’ by way of the 
Saving-to-Suitors clause.”54  In this case, the defendant-insured 
owned a vessel that was damaged at sea and submitted a claim with 
the plaintiff-insurer as a result of the significant damage.55  The 
plaintiff-insurer filed a declaratory judgment action to determine 
whether the claim was time-barred under the marine insurance 
policy, and designated the claim as one “in admiralty” under Rule 
9(h) to preclude a jury trial.56  The defendant-insured filed a 
counterclaim seeking payment for damage to the ship, requesting a 
jury trial.57 
Overruling the judgment of the United States District Court 
for the District of Maryland, the Fourth Circuit focused on two 
provisions critical to the jury-trial determination: the Seventh 
Amendment and the “Saving-to-Suitors” clause.58  The court noted 
that there is no constitutional prohibition of jury trials in cases 
 
insured to file a breach of contract action, and thus, the insured would be the 
plaintiff in the action.  In this case, the reverse has occurred.  Nonetheless, this 
Court will take this opportunity to realign the parties and their respective 
claims in the interests of fairness and comprehensibility.”); Reliance Nat. Ins. 
Co. (Eur.) v. Hanover, 222 F. Supp. 2d 110, 115–16 (D. Mass. 2002) (“While 
there is no uniform answer to the question as to how a court is to proceed in a 
hybrid case, it is required to do its utmost to protect a party’s right to a jury 
trial.”); Sphere Drake Ins. PLC v. J. Shree Corp., 184 F.R.D. 258, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999). 
 54.  503 F.3d at 356; see also Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 
148, 153 (4th Cir. 1995) (“While trials to different factfinders may be required 
in actions having law and equity components because of the jury’s inability to 
fashion equitable remedies, that result is not compelled when claims at law 
and in admiralty, arising out of a single accident, are combined in a single 
complaint for damages. To render the trial process in that particular 
circumstance less cumbersome, confusing, and time-consuming, the Supreme 
Court has adopted the pragmatic procedural rule that both the admiralty claim 
and the law claim be decided by the jury so that ‘[o]nly one trier of fact [is] used 
for the trial of what is essentially one lawsuit to settle one claim split 
conceptually into separate parts because of historical developments.’” (quoting 
Fitzgerald v. U.S. Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 21 (1963)).  
 55.  In re Lockheed Martin, 503 F.3d at 352.  The policy claim exceeded 
$2.6 million in damage.  Id. at 353.  
 56.  Id. (“On July 22, 2005, [plaintiff-insurer] preemptively filed a 
declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that [defendant-insured’s] 
claims were time-barred under the policy.” (emphasis added)). 
 57.  Id.  
 58.  See id. at 354.  
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tried “in admiralty,” and further held that the Seventh Amendment 
right to a jury trial is not “inapplicable” to the determination of 
these cases.59  The court reasoned that the “Seventh Amendment 
applies to admiralty claims that are tried ‘at law’ by way of the 
saving-to-suitors clause,”60 and that to allow the plaintiff-insurer 
the ability to strip the defendant-insured of the right to a jury trial 
is “inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s admonition that the 
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial must be preserved 
‘wherever possible.’”61 
The court made the proper inquiry when determining whether 
to strike the defendant-insured’s demand for a jury trial; it ignored 
the alignment of the parties under the declaratory judgment action 
and “instead look[ed] to how the action otherwise would have 
proceeded.”62  The court concluded that the defendant-insured 
would have had the right under the “Saving-to-Suitors” clause to 
proceed with the claim “at law” and successfully demand a jury trial 
under the Seventh Amendment.63  It boldly but correctly asserted 
that “it is an oversimplification to say that the Seventh Amendment 
does not apply in admiralty.”64  Finally, the court recognized that 
the Seventh Amendment does not apply to an “admiralty claim,” 
but could be applicable to certain circumstances where concurrent 
jurisdiction exists.65 The plaintiff-insurer petitioned for Supreme 
Court review in this case, but the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari.66 
B. The Declaratory Judgment Act and Subsequent Case-Law 
With the enactment of the Declaratory Judgment Act67 came 
 
 59.  Id. at 354, 356 (“The Seventh Amendment’s guarantee of a jury trial, 
however, applies only to cases at law, a category that does not include maritime 
cases . . . . If an admiralty claim is tried ‘at law,’ the claim nonetheless remains 
an admiralty claim, and substantive admiralty law governs the disposition of 
the claim.  That such claims remain admiralty claims, however, does not mean 
that the Seventh Amendment is inapplicable.” (citations omitted)). 
 60.  Id. at 356. 
 61.  Id. at 358 (citations omitted).  
 62.  See id. at 359.  
 63.  See id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id.  
 66.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Nat’l Cas. Co. v. Lockheed Martin 
Corp., 553 U.S. 1017 (2008) (No. 07-948). 
 67.  28 U.S.C.A. § 2201 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316) (“In a case 
of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the United States, 
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many questions regarding the procedural consequences it would 
have on cases, most notably the right to a jury trial.  When 
interpreting the original version of the Act, many appellate courts 
had to decide how this new device would affect a party’s 
constitutional right to a jury trial on legal claims, when the 
opposing party brought a declaratory action without a demand for 
a jury trial.  The initial determination was that the declaratory 
action itself was neither legal nor equitable, and that by bringing 
this type of action the plaintiff could not preclude the defendant 
from obtaining a trial by jury.68  In 1959, the United States 
Supreme Court solidified these lower-court decisions in Beacon 
Theaters Inc. v. Westover, where the Court held that the right to a 
jury trial in a declaratory judgment action depends on whether 
there would have been a right to a jury trial had the action 
proceeded without the declaratory judgment vehicle.69  The Court 
concluded that the analysis should focus on whether or not the 
defendant in the declaratory judgment action would have a 
constitutional right to a jury trial on the counterclaim had the 
parties been properly aligned.70 Beacon Theaters and its 
predecessors seemed to, at the very least, indicate that a 
declaratory judgment action by itself should not deprive a 
defendant-insured of his or her right to a jury trial.71 
The critical question, which has been the subject of much legal 
 
upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other 
legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not 
further relief is or could be sought.  Any such declaration shall have the force 
and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.”). 
 68.  See Hargrove v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co., 125 F.2d 225, 228 (10th Cir. 1942) 
(“Whether the issues are tendered by suit under the Declaratory Judgment 
Act, or as a defense to an action to recover on the policies, the rights of the 
parties are the same and the rule with respect to trial by jury is the same.”).  
 69.  359 U.S. 500, 504 (1959).  
 70.  See id. at 501 (quoting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935)) 
(“Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance and 
occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming 
curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost 
care.”). 
 71.  See Johnson v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 238 F.2d 322, 325 (8th Cir. 
1956); Okla. Contracting Co. v. Magnolia Pipe Line Co., 195 F.2d 391, 396 (5th 
Cir. 1952); Dickinson v. Gen. Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 147 F.2d 396, 
397 (9th Cir. 1945); (Am.) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. of Ill. v. Timms & 
Howard, 108 F.2d 497, 499 (2d Cir. 1939); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Koch, 102 
F.2d 288, 295 (3d Cir. 1939); Pac. Indem. Co. v. McDonald, 107 F.2d 446, 449 
(9th Cir. 1939). 
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scholarly debate in admiralty law, is whether the focus of the 
analysis should be centered on the subject-matter of the case (being 
a maritime cause of action versus a non-maritime cause of action), 
or whether it should revolve around the type of relief sought (action 
seeking declaratory relief as opposed to a traditional lawsuit 
seeking damages).72  In this respect, it is important to consider the 
distinction made earlier in this Comment73 and note this author’s 
proposition: there could be a different outcome regarding the right 
to a jury trial in the broader category of cases described as “hybrid 
cases” than those where the plaintiff-insurer brings a declaratory 
judgment action. As mentioned earlier, “hybrid cases” are those 
where the plaintiff brings a traditional cause of action against the 
defendant invoking the federal court’s admiralty jurisdiction.  The 
defendant then brings a counterclaim,74 but wishes to invoke 
another basis of federal subject-matter jurisdiction so that the 
defendant can demand a jury trial for the “legal” counterclaim.  The 
significance of the declaratory action is highlighted when you 
recognize the distinction between these two situations based on the 
alignment of the parties.  Without the declaratory judgment 
vehicle, the alignment of the parties would be reversed; this 
reversal would have serious consequences on choice of forum,75 
choice of subject-matter jurisdiction in federal court,76 and the 
 
 72.  See generally Steven E. Goldman & Michael I. Goldman, Is the Jury 
Still Out?  The Controversy Over the Traditional Rule Requiring a Non-Jury 
Trial in Marine Insurance Declaratory Judgment Actions in Federal Court, 41 
J. MAR. L. & COM. 117 (2010) (discussing circuit split regarding whether a 
plaintiff-insurer’s decision to file an admiralty claim requires a bench trial for 
all claims in a case, and criticizing the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Lockheed 
Martin). 
 73.  See supra Section II.C. (distinguishing “hybrid case,” where both 
plaintiff and defendant bring actions for damages, and a case where only the 
defendant-insured has claim for damages and the plaintiff-insurer brings a 
claim for declaratory relief; only permissible because of statute). 
 74.  The legal counterclaim in the “hybrid case” scenario could be 
permissive under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(b) or compulsory under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a).  See FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a)–(b).  However, 
this is not the case when the plaintiff-insurer seeks declaratory relief; the 
counterclaim for breach of contract is strictly compulsory because the claim 
“arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the 
opposing party’s claim.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a)(1)(A).  
 75.  The defendant-insured would be the only party that could determine 
the choice of state or federal court, based on the “Saving-to-Suitors” clause.  
The plaintiff-insurer would have no claim against the defendant-insured.  
 76.  The defendant-insured would be the only party that could choose 
between suing “at law,” 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331–1332 (Westlaw through Pub. L. 
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procedural consequences that follow these choices.  Alternatively, 
in “hybrid cases” the party alignment remains the same, as the 
plaintiff is bringing an actual claim seeking damages or injunctive 
relief from the defendant as opposed to a mere declaration 
regarding a controversy.77 
In “hybrid cases,” the argument in favor of the defendant’s 
right to a jury trial is substantially weaker.  In order to be 
successful, the individual demanding a jury trial would have to 
overcome a strong custom in admiralty law that factual 
determinations are to be made by the court instead of the jury.78  In 
the case of a declaratory judgment claim, the plaintiff-insurer 
arguing against the defendant-insured’s right to a jury trial would 
have to overcome the essential purpose of the “Saving-to-Suitors” 
clause: the right of an aggrieved party to choose an alternative 
forum to resolve an admiralty claim.79 
C.  The Purpose of the “Saving-to-Suitors” Clause  
When drafting The Judiciary Act of 1789, the authors included 
this provision following a declaration of exclusive federal subject 
matter jurisdiction in cases of admiralty: “saving to suitors, in all 
cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is 
competent to give it . . . .”80  By doing so, aggrieved parties now have 
the ability to bring their admiralty claim “at law” in federal court, 
or in state court, so long as the remedy sought is available in that 
forum.81  The legal analysis used to determine whether that remedy 
 
No. 114–254), or “in admiralty,” id. § 1333, based on the “Saving-to-Suitors” 
clause. 
 77.  In “hybrid cases,” both parties have a claim regardless of the 
Declaratory Judgment Act, so either party could make the above 
determinations. 
 78.  See Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. 441, 460 (1847) (holding that Seventh 
Amendment does not apply to cases “in admiralty”); Vodusek v. Bayliner 
Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 153 (4th Cir. 1995) (“Traditionally . . . admiralty 
courts and courts of equity did not rely on juries.”); Koch Fuels, Inc. v. Cargo 
of 13,000 Barrels of No. 2 Oil, 704 F.2d 1038, 1041 (8th Cir. 1983) (“Ordinarily, 
admiralty claims are tried to the court.”). 
 79.  See Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 454 (2001) 
(“Tracing the development of the clause since the Judiciary Act of 1789, it 
appears that the clause was designed to protect remedies available at common 
law.”).   
 80.  Ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 77 (current version at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333). 
 81.  The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. 411, 431 (1866) (“[The Saving-to-Suitors] 
clause only saves to suitors ‘the right of a common-law remedy, where the 
common law is competent to give it.’  It is not a remedy in the common-law 
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is available under the “Saving-to-Suitors” clause is a historical test: 
whether that remedy was available in the common law courts at the 
time of enactment.82  This has excluded several types of cases from 
the “Saving-to-Suitors” clause, but the right to a jury trial is 
recognized as provided by the common law and available to 
plaintiffs today.83  When deciding whether a defendant-insured is 
entitled to a jury trial in a declaratory action, it is important to ask 
for whom the “Saving-to-Suitors” clause was intended.  That is, 
what was the authors’ purpose for allowing suits to be brought 
outside the traditional admiralty courts and whom exactly would 
that benefit?  Obviously, this provision was included well before the 
enactment of the Declaratory Judgment Act in 1934.84 
Before the enactment of the Declaratory Judgment Act, parties 
attempting to resolve a marine insurance dispute would always be 
properly aligned.  The plaintiff would be the insured party suing 
the defendant insurance company for breach of contract or another 
relevant cause of action.  The insurance company would have no 
claim against the insured party and the insurance company would 
have to wait for the insured party to sue in order to resolve the 
claim against the company.  Because of this, only the insured party 
would have the choice of forum under § 1333(1) and therefore it 
would have ultimate control over certain procedural 
consequences.85  When a declaratory judgment action is introduced 
into this scenario, the choice of forum and the resulting 
consequences following that decision are effectively stripped from 
the insured party, and the insurance company has the ability to 
control important aspects of the lawsuit.86  When analyzing this 
 
courts which is saved, but a common-law remedy.” (quoting id.)). 
 82.  See id.  
 83.  See U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 84. Andrew Bradt, “Much to Gain and Nothing to Lose”: Implications of 
the History of the Declaratory Judgment for the (b)(2) Class Action, 58 ARK. L. 
REV. 767, 771 (2006). 
 85.  For example, the bench trial custom of admiralty law only applies to 
admiralty courts.  See, e.g., Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. 441, 460 (1847) (“But 
there is no provision, as the constitution originally was, from which it can be 
inferred that civil causes in admiralty were to be tried by a jury, contrary to 
what the framers of the constitution knew was the mode of trial of issues of 
fact in the admiralty.  We confess, then, we cannot see how they are to be 
embraced in the seventh amendment of the constitution, providing that in suits 
at common law the trial by jury should be preserved.”). 
 86.  These include aspects of the lawsuit that were originally designed to 
be provided to suitors/plaintiffs under the “Saving-to-Suitors” clause.  See 
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factual situation and considering the ultimate purpose of the 
“Saving-to-Suitors” clause, it would seem that the intent of 
Congress in enacting the Judiciary Act of 1789 has been nullified 
and rendered useless to injured parties. 
In 1847, the United States Supreme Court was tasked with 
determining whom in fact the word “suitors” applied when deciding 
Waring v. Clark.87  The facts of this case closely resemble what has 
been subsequently described as a “hybrid case;”88 and it is the 
absence of procedural methods to realign the parties that makes 
this decision so significant.  In this case, the plaintiff brought a 
claim “in admiralty” against the defendant based on a collision 
between two vessels on the navigable waters of the Mississippi 
River, and the plaintiff requested a bench trial.89  The defendant 
demanded a jury trial on all issues, asserting that his common law 
counterclaim required the Court to respect his Seventh Amendment 
right even though the plaintiff brought his claim “in admiralty.”90  
Deciding to the contrary, the Court concluded that “[the “Saving-to-
Suitors” clause] certainly could not have been intended more for the 
benefit of the defendant than for the plaintiff, which would be the 
case if he could at his will force the plaintiff into a common law 
court . . . .”91 This holding essentially limited the defendant’s ability 
to remove a case brought “in admiralty” by a plaintiff to a state 
court or a federal court “at law,” simply because the defendant could 
have brought the counterclaim outside of admiralty jurisdiction.92  
How does one reconcile the Court’s conclusion above with the 
procedural exception proposed in this Comment?  
After Waring, it would seem as though the question regarding 
the right to a jury trial in “hybrid cases” had been answered:  the 
defendant cannot nullify the plaintiff’s choice to sue in admiralty.93  
This quote from the opinion, however, has also been used to argue 
 
Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 455 (2001).  
 87.  46 U.S. at 461 (“The saving is for the benefit of suitors, plaintiff and 
defendant, when the plaintiff in a case of concurrent jurisdiction chooses to sue 
in the common law courts, so giving to himself and the defendant all the 
advantages which such tribunals can give to suitors in them.”).  
 88.  See id. (“[I]n cases of concurrent jurisdiction in admiralty and common 
law . . . .”).  
 89.  Id. at 451–52.  
 90.  Id. at 451–53.   
 91.  Id. at 461. 
 92.  See id.  
 93.  See id at 460.  
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that the same conclusion must apply to defendant-insureds seeking 
a jury trial in a declaratory judgment action brought by an 
insurance company.94  In order to analyze a case involving a 
declaratory judgment properly, it is important to carefully read 
Justice Wayne’s language and determine who the “defendant” is 
and who the “plaintiff” is for the purposes of this analysis.95  
Without the Declaratory Judgment Act, the alignment of the 
parties would be proper, making the “defendant” the insurance 
company and the “plaintiff” the insured party.96  Arguably, this 
analysis is irrelevant, as the Act is good law and commonly used 
today.97  However, if one continues to the next clause of Justice 
Wayne’s opinion, while hypothetically keeping the parties in their 
“proper” alignment,98 one would realize who is actually being forced 
into the court not of their choice and stripped of the tactical 
benefit.99   
Previous courts addressing the “Saving-to-Suitors” clause have 
recognized that “[o]ne of the remedies saved to suitors is the right 
to a trial by jury.”100  This remedy should not be stripped of 
aggrieved parties simply because of newly developed procedural 
devices created by subsequent legislation.  Even if the Declaratory 
Judgment Act provides an avenue for plaintiff-insurers to get into 
federal court, future defendant-insureds should retain the 
fundamental procedural benefits they would have enjoyed absent a 
declaratory judgment action.  It is important to point out once again 
that, without the Declaratory Judgment Act, this problem would 
not arise; the aggrieved party would have ultimate control over the 
forum and procedures as intended by Congress when enacting the 
“Saving-to-Suitors” clause.  To protect defendant-insureds from the 
harsh consequences of this procedural anomaly, federal courts must 
step in and create the proposed exception.  
 
 94.  See e.g., Goldman & Goldman, supra note 72, at 120–23.   
 95.  See Waring, 46 U.S. at 461.  
 96.  See id.   
 97.  See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-254).  
 98.  By “proper,” the author means the way the parties would be aligned 
without the use of a declaratory judgment action. 
 99.  See Waring, 46 U.S. at 461.  
 100.  Atl. & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 360, 
(1962) (“[T]rial by jury is part of the remedy.”); In re Complaint of McAllister 
Towing of Va., Inc., 999 F. Supp. 797, 799 (E.D. Va. 1998) (“One of the remedies 
saved to suitors is the right to a trial by jury.”).  
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D. The Principle of Abstention and Judicial Discretion in 
Declaratory Judgment Actions 
Another argument in favor of specific procedural exceptions for 
cases involving declaratory actions is the broad judicial discretion 
provided to judges when deciding to hear declaratory actions, as 
well as the principle of abstention from hearing cases in federal 
court in general.  The majority of federal cases that address these 
principles involve parallel cases; parallel cases are those where a 
plaintiff files a state court action first, and then the defendant 
brings a separate action in a federal court,101 addressing the same 
underlying issue as the state court action.  Although the factual 
scenario involving a plaintiff-insurer bringing a declaratory action 
against a defendant-insured does not usually involve another state 
court proceeding, the general principles apply because both 
situations involve the same choice of forum option that the 
defendant-insured wishes to protect.102 
An excellent example of the interaction between the principle 
of abstention and a declaratory judgment action, specifically in the 
maritime law context, is demonstrated in the following line of cases.  
In Youell v. Exxon Corporation, the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of New York dismissed the plaintiff-insurers’ 
declaratory judgment action, invoking the principle of 
abstention.103  In this case, the defendant-insured filed an action in 
a Texas state court based on losses resulting from the infamous 
grounding of the Exxon Valdez off the coast of Alaska in 1989.104  
The plaintiff-insurers simultaneously filed a declaratory judgment 
action in federal court arising from the same circumstances 
 
 101.  The separate action brought by the defendant in federal court is 
usually a declaratory judgment action, as the plaintiff bringing a claim in state 
court is the party typically seeking damages. See, e.g., In re Complaint of 
McAllister, 999 F.Supp. at 798.  Of course, there can be instances where the 
defendant filing an action in federal court has a valid claim for damages 
against the plaintiff who has filed a claim in state court.   
 102.  Put another way, in both situations the main objective is to maintain 
the aggrieved party’s ability to choose the forum. See supra text accompanying 
note 75.  By “aggrieved party,” the author again refers to the party bringing a 
claim for damages as opposed to declaratory relief.  
 103.  No. 93 Civ. 6093, 1994 WL 376068, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 1994) 
(“The Texas action—which will ultimately resolve all of the issues raised in the 
Underwriters’ complaint—renders this suit wholly unnecessary.”). 
 104.  Id. at *1 (“As a result of the accident, Exxon incurred expenses and 
liabilities for, inter alia, cargo loss, clean up, and third-party claims.”).   
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underlying the defendant-insured’s state court claim, seeking an 
order to determine that they were not liable based on the policy.105  
The district court concluded that under the analysis laid out by the 
United States Supreme Court,106 abstention from hearing the 
declaratory judgment action in this particular case was 
appropriate.107  Although the district court may have relied on the 
parallel state proceeding as justification for its decision, it 
nonetheless held that “it is a ‘misuse of the Declaratory Judgment 
Act’ to employ it to ‘gain a procedural advantage and preempt the 
forum choice of the plaintiff in [a] coercive action . . . .’”108  The right 
to a jury trial could have been one of the procedural advantages 
contemplated by the district court; therefore, the court suggested 
that any deprivation of this right should be carefully considered by 
a court before deciding to hear a declaratory judgment action.  The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the 
judgment of the district court below, focusing on the novel 
determination of federal law that was underlying the parties’ 
controversy.109 
Following the Second Circuit’s decision in Youell, the United 
States Supreme Court confirmed the principle of abstention in 
declaratory judgment actions in Wilton v. Seven Falls Company.110  
 
 105.  Id. at *5 (“Looking to the potential for duplicative litigation, the Court 
notes initially that this action . . . presents the same issues and parties present 
in the Texas forum.”). 
 106. The Supreme Court has identified six factors a district court should 
weigh in considering whether a defendant has established “exceptional 
circumstances” warranting abstention: (1) whether either the federal or state 
court has assumed jurisdiction over any ‘res’ or property; (2) inconvenience of 
the federal forum; (3) avoidance of piecemeal litigation; (4) the order in which 
jurisdiction was obtained; (5) whether state or federal law supplies the rule of 
decision; and (6) whether the state court proceeding will adequately protect the 
rights of the parties.  Youell, 1994 WL 376068, at *3 (citing Moses H. Cone 
Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 23–27 (1983); Colorado 
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818 (1976)).  
 107.  Youell, 1994 WL 376068, at *7; see Youell v. Exxon Corp., 48 F.3d 105, 
107 (2d Cir. 1995) (“The district court concluded that abstention was 
appropriate because (1) a parallel action was already proceeding in Texas state 
court, (2) states have a strong interest in insurance regulation, and (3) the case 
was controlled predominantly by state law.”).  
 108.  Youell, 1994 WL 376068, at *6 (quoting Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Houston 
Gen. Ins., 735 F. Supp. 581, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)).  
 109.  See Youell, 48 F.3d at 113 (“This is a novel issue of federal admiralty 
law, and a federal court should decide it.”). 
 110.  515 U.S. 277, 288 (1995) (“Consistent with the nonobligatory nature 
of the remedy, a district court is authorized, in the sound exercise of its 
476 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 22:453 
The defendant in Wilton filed an action in a Texas state court, which 
immediately led the plaintiff to file a declaratory action in federal 
court based on the same factual circumstances.111  The Court, 
relying on the abstention principle laid out in Brillhart v. Excess 
Insurance Company of America,112 held that, “district courts 
possess discretion in determining whether and when to entertain 
an action under the Declaratory Judgment Act, even when the suit 
otherwise satisfies [federal] subject matter jurisdictional 
prerequisites.”113  The Court continued: “‘[t]here is . . . nothing 
automatic or obligatory about the assumption of “jurisdiction” by a 
federal court’ to hear a declaratory judgment action . . . . [The Act] 
created an opportunity, rather than a duty, to grant a new form of 
relief to qualifying litigants.”114  By continuously reiterating the 
broad discretion afforded to district courts in this decision, the 
Court seemed to recognize the serious consequences that could arise 
from declaratory actions due to the inverse positioning of the 
parties.115  The United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment 
of the Second Circuit in Youell and remanded the case for further 
consideration in light of the Court’s decision in Wilton.116 
An important aspect of abstention is the relationship between 
the federal and state interest being decided.117  If the legal issue 
being addressed is one of general maritime law, the need for 
uniformity in decision-making is a strong argument in favor of 
bench trials.  Where state law decides the substantive issues of the 
case, however, the lack of consistency that could arise from jury 
trials does not pose a serious threat to the uniform nature of 
admiralty law because each jurisdiction could already have 
 
discretion, to stay or to dismiss an action seeking a declaratory judgment 
before trial or after all arguments have drawn to a close.”). 
 111.  Id. at 279–80.  
 112.  316 U.S. 491, 494 (1942) (“Although the District Court had jurisdiction 
of the suit under the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 400, it 
was under no compulsion to exercise that jurisdiction.”).  
 113.  Wilton, 515 U.S. at 282.  
 114.  Id. at 288 (citation omitted).  
 115.  Id. at 286–90. 
 116.  Exxon Corp. v. Youell, 516 U.S. 801 (1995). The Second Circuit, 
following remand from the Supreme Court, again reversed the district court’s 
decision to dismiss the declaratory judgment action. See Youell v. Exxon Corp., 
74 F.3d 373, 374 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Even when made under the more 
discretionary Brillhart doctrine, a decision to abstain in this case would 
constitute an abuse of discretion in light of the important federal question 
presented.”).  
 117.  See Youell v. Exxon Corp., 48 F.3d 105, 113 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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significantly different positions on certain issues.  The typical 
argument raised by parties opposed to abstention is the novelty of 
a federal issue and the need for resolution of that issue by a federal 
court.118  If the question posed in the declaratory action does in fact 
raise a novel question of federal law, previous federal court 
decisions have declared that is, in itself, justifiable grounds for 
denying a request for abstention.119 
Marine insurance, however, is one area of admiralty and 
maritime law that has been committed to the legislatures and 
courts of the individual states.120  Because of this delegation of 
authority to the states over this specific area of maritime law, it 
would be very difficult for a party opposing abstention to argue that 
the declaratory action raises an issue that should or must be 
decided by a federal district court.  Although abstention is probably 
not what the defendant-insured is seeking, as the party would 
probably bring the action “at law” in a federal district court anyway, 
the right to a jury trial in actions involving declaratory judgments 
is significantly advanced by the broad discretion federal courts have 
in denying to hear the case. 
E. Bench Trials v. Jury Trials:  An Ulterior Motive and the Race 
to the Courthouse 
When moving to strike a defendant-insured’s demand for a jury 
trial, plaintiff-insurers typically argue that traditional admiralty 
customs should be adhered to, and that these customs prevail over 
Seventh Amendment assertions.  It is worth questioning, however, 
what the underlying reason is behind the enormous amount of time 
and money spent by large insurance companies to have these cases 
tried by the bench.  It could be argued that objective, neutral judges 
 
 118.  See id. at 114. 
 119.  See id. at 111–12 (“[A] federal question of first impression must all but 
demand that the federal court hear the case.”); see also Colorado River Water 
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 824 U.S. 800, 818 (1975) (“[T]he 
circumstances permitting the dismissal of a federal suit due to the presence of 
a concurrent state proceeding for reasons of wise judicial administration are 
considerably more limited than the circumstances appropriate for 
abstention.”).  
 120.  See Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 313, 
321 (1954) (“In the field of maritime contracts as in that of maritime torts, the 
National Government has left much regulatory power in the States . . . . We, 
like Congress, leave the regulation of marine insurance where it has been—
with the States.”).  
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are less likely to find liability on behalf of the insurance companies, 
whereas a jury is more likely to align themselves with the aggrieved 
plaintiff based on the factual circumstances of the case and rule in 
their favor.  Moreover, once liability has been established, it could 
also be argued that juries are more likely to award a higher amount 
in damages based on emotion, compared to precise damages 
awarded by a more conservative bench.  Arguably, it is for these 
collateral reasons that insurance companies have vigorously fought 
to defend their preference for bench trials in admiralty cases when 
using declaratory judgment actions. 
If the United States Supreme Court does decide to take this 
issue up on appeal in a later case, and ultimately concludes that a 
defendant-insured does not have a Seventh Amendment right to a 
jury trial, the repercussions of such a ruling could significantly 
impact the secondary, or litigation related, conduct of the two 
parties.  If the defendant-insured wishes to have a jury trial on a 
breach of contract claim against the plaintiff-insurer, the 
policyholder would have to file the cause of action immediately in 
order to prevent the insurance company from filing a declaratory 
action.  Even if the insured party reaches the state court before the 
insurance company files a declaratory judgment action, the federal 
court hearing the declaratory action could decide the issue should 
be resolved by the federal court without a jury, and the federal court 
could stay the state court proceedings where the defendant-insured 
would have a right to a jury trial.  The result of such a decision 
would be company guidelines among marine insurance firms to 
seek declaratory relief once notified that a potential claim exists.  
This “race to the courthouse” effect, inadequately dismissed by the 
court in St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company v. Holiday 
Fair, Inc., is a strong policy justification for permitting the use of a 
jury trial in declaratory actions brought “in admiralty.”121 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The founders of our Nation considered the right of trial by 
jury in civil cases an important bulwark against tyranny 
and corruption, a safeguard too precious to be left to the 
whim of the sovereign, or, it might be added, to that of the 
judiciary.  Those who passionately advocated the right to a 
 
 121.  No. 94 Civ. 5707 (TPG), 1996 WL 148350, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 
1996). 
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civil jury trial did not do so because they considered the 
jury a familiar procedural device that should be continued; 
the concerns for the institution of jury trial that led to the 
passages of the Declaration of Independence and to the 
Seventh Amendment were not animated by a belief that 
use of juries would lead to more efficient judicial 
administration.  Trial by a jury of laymen rather than by 
the sovereign’s judges was important to the founders 
because juries represent the layman’s common sense, the 
“passional elements in our nature,” and thus keep the 
administration of law in accord with the wishes and 
feelings of the community.122   
It is worth noting two well-accepted and fundamental 
principles of admiralty subject-matter jurisdiction: there is no 
Seventh Amendment constitutional right to a jury trial in cases 
tried “in admiralty,”123 and there is absolutely no constitutional 
prohibition against holding a jury trial in cases tried “in 
admiralty.”124  It is probably for this reason that this specific issue 
has developed into a controversial topic of procedural law.  As 
mentioned earlier, the historical significance of bench trials in 
courts of admiralty cannot go unrecognized.  Bench trials are 
essential to maintaining the uniformity of federal law, and they 
prevent uninformed juries from making decisions on complex and 
novel issues of maritime law.125  The situation presented, however, 
is unique and includes issues that go well beyond the traditional 
cases tried in admiralty courts.  
Once again, the two competing interests asserted are the 
defendant-insured’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial and 
the plaintiff-insurer’s preference for a bench trial.  Although the 
defendant-insured, in this case the vessel owner, does not have 
grounds for asserting that there is a specific constitutional right in 
courts of admiralty,126 courts must take into consideration that 
without the declaratory judgment vehicle, the parties in the 
hypothetical would be properly aligned and the insured party would 
 
 122.  Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 343–44 (1979) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (J. William H. Rehnquist stressing the significance 
of the civil jury trial) (citation omitted). 
 123.  See Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. 441, 461 (1847). 
 124.  See Fitzgerald v. U.S. Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963). 
 125.  See Goldman & Goldman, supra note 72, at 139–40. 
 126.  See Waring, 46 U.S. at 461. 
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have that Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in a federal 
district court “at law.”127  It has already been decided that the 
Declaratory Judgment Act cannot displace parties of their 
constitutional rights,128 and courts must apply these historic cases 
in the admiralty context to prevent parties from continually being 
stripped of their right set forth in the “Saving-to-Suitors” clause of 
28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). 
In Sphere Drake Insurance PLC v. J. Shree Corporation, the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 
perfectly described the significance of the right to a trial by jury 
when denying a plaintiff-insurer’s motion to strike the defendant-
insured’s demand for a jury trial: “[t]here is, perhaps, no concept 
that is more fundamental to the American judicial system than the 
right to trial by jury.”129  Courts addressing this particular issue130 
should follow the same lead, recognizing a narrow exception131 for 
cases brought by a plaintiff-insurer “in admiralty” under the 
Declaratory Judgment Act, ultimately granting a defendant-
insured’s demand for a jury trial while allowing the case to proceed 
in a federal district court. 
 
 127.  See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value 
in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved . . . .”). 
 128.  See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Quarles, 92 F.2d 321, 325 (4th Cir. 1937) 
(“[I]t is clear that the right of jury trial in what is essentially an action at law 
may not be denied a litigant merely because his adversary has asked that the 
controversy be determined under the declaratory procedure.”). 
 129.  184 F.R.D. 258, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 130.  This issue is limited to this proposed exception to declaratory 
judgment actions, not the broader “hybrid cases” that include multiple claims 
for damages with independent jurisdictional bases. 
 131.  A broader exception would address the right to a jury trial in “hybrid 
cases,” and that issue does not have to be resolved in order to create the 
proposed exception set forth in this Comment. 
